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This paper sets out to analyse the determinants of recent
foreign bank investments in the Brazilian retail banking
market and the strategies of the major European banks in
Brazil. Since the recent wave of banking internationalization,
financial institutions have continued to pursue their existing
relationships while seeking greater integration into local
markets. The recent influx of European banks into Latin
America and Brazil, meanwhile, has been due to a varied
range of factors, including bank restructuring in Europe,
the dynamic of internationalization in the Spanish banking
system and the process of market deregulation in the region.
The paper also stresses some common and specific features
of the major European banks in Brazil. One common feature
is that they are large universal banks which have chosen to
develop abroad as a business expansion strategy.
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I
Introduction
During the 1970s and 1980s, the presence of foreign
financial institutions in Brazil was confined to minority
stakes in investment banks and leasing companies,
although there were no restrictions on the establishment
of representative offices. Later, the 1988 Constitution
prohibited foreign financial institutions from setting up
new agencies or increasing their capital holdings in
locally based financial institutions. However, article 52
of the temporary provisions act of the 1988 Constitution
established that such restrictions did not apply to
authorizations resulting from international agreements,
reciprocity or decisions made in the interests of the
Brazilian government. In 1995, owing to the banking
crisis triggered by contagion from the Mexican crisis,
the Brazilian Government allowed some foreign
institutions to take over certain troubled local banks.
This step was also intended to strengthen the domestic
banking sector. Consequently, foreign banks increased
their stake in total Brazilian banking sector assets from
8.4% in 1995 to 27.4% in 2000. Interestingly, it was
European banks –Banco Santander Central Hispano
(BSCH), HSBC and ABN Amro, among others– that led
the main operations involving foreign banks in Brazil
during the 1990s.
This paper sets out to analyse the factors that have
recently led foreign banks to enter the Brazilian market
and the strategies of the major European banks in Latin
America and Brazil.1
Section II analyses the factors giving rise to the
banking internationalization process, and shows that
the recent wave of banking internationalization has been
characterized not only by the pursuit of existing
relationships, with financial institutions catering mainly
to their home country customers, but also and
increasingly by greater integration into local markets.
Section III examines the determinants of foreign bank
investment in Brazil and shows that the recent arrival
of a wave of European banks in Latin America and
Brazil has been driven by a varied range of factors,
including the process of banking sector restructuring
that has resulted from European monetary union (EMU),
the dynamics of internationalization among Spanish
banks (which have been the main players in the recent
influx of foreign banks into Latin America), the process
of market deregulation in the region since the early
1990s, the better prospects of rising returns to financial
institutions offered by the region in comparison with
developed countries, and the potential for efficiency
gains. In the case of Brazil, the banking crisis of 1995
was a milestone, since it resulted in the country opening
up to foreign banks.
Section IV considers the recent penetration of
European banks in Brazil. Section V analyses the Latin
American expansion strategies of the major European
banks –BSCH, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA),
HSBC and ABN Amro, one of whose common features
is that they are large universal banks which chose to
extend their operations abroad as a business expansion
strategy– and identifies some specific factors behind
the expansion of each financial group. Lastly, section
VI summarizes the main arguments developed in the
paper.
This paper is part of a research project conducted at the
University of Oxford Centre for Brazilian Studies. It was written
with data available up to January 2002. An earlier and longer version
of the paper was published by the Société Universitaire Européenne
de Recherches Financières as SUERF Studies No. 18. I am very
grateful to Pablo Toral and an anonymous CEPAL Review referee for
many helpful comments. All remaining errors are, of course, my
own responsibility.
1 It thus seeks to analyse only the factors leading foreign banks to
enter the retail banking market in Brazil, and not the effects of this
process. These are discussed by Carvalho (2002) and Paula (2002b).
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II
Banking internationalization: the strategic
rationale for expansion
Cross-border consolidation among financial institutions
has accelerated over the last few years, and has recently
reached the retail banking market. For the purposes of
this section, what needs to be asked is why banks
headquartered in particular countries set up branches
or subsidiaries in foreign countries.
Generally speaking, the literature of the 1970s and
1980s (Grubel, 1977; Aliber, 1984) built up a theory of
international banking that was heavily influenced by
the theory of foreign direct investment in
manufacturing, as advanced by Kindleberger (1969),
Vernon (1966) and Caves (1971). According to this
explanation, multinational banks have some
comparative advantages. Banks go abroad to serve their
domestic customers who have done likewise, a process
sometimes termed the “gravitational pull effect”.
Multinational banking grows in parallel with foreign
direct investment as banks try to meet the demand for
banking services from multinational firms abroad. The
willingness of banks to move abroad in these
circumstances is seen as essentially defensive, a way
of ensuring that they will continue to do business with
the domestic parents of foreign subsidiaries, so that the
existing flow of information resulting from the bank-
client relationship will not be pre-empted by a
competitor bank. Secondarily, multinational service
banks also do some business with wealthy individuals
locally, supplying them with the specialist services and
information required for trade and capital market
dealings with their home countries.
The motives leading banks to expand abroad can
be interpreted in price-theoretic terms. According to
Grubel (1977), “the continuous commercial contacts
between the bank and manufacturing firm permit the
bank to have access to information about the firm’s
financial conditions at such a low cost and high speed
that it is in a better position than any other competitor
to evaluate and respond to the firm’s demand for loans”.
Thus, “the ability to draw on the information and
personal contacts between the bank’s and
manufacturing firm’s parents in a [foreign country] at
very low marginal cost represents the main source of
comparative advantage that the bank’s foreign branch
has in dealing with the firm’s subsidiary abroad in
competition with the local banks” (Grubel, 1977,
pp. 352-353). According to this view, the internalization
of information is the principal advantage enjoyed by
the multinational bank. In this connection, Casson
(1990, p. 18) states that “when technology draws a firm
to a new location abroad, the bank which has serviced
the expanding firm at its home location has an advantage
over indigenous firms in serving the new foreign
subsidiary. This advantage is goodwill derived from
special knowledge of the customer’s requirements and
it is a monopolistic advantage which is not patentable
and which can be transferred abroad. The internalisation
of this advantage transforms the domestic bank into a
multinational bank”. This is indeed the case with the
large United States banks that are involved in wholesale
and business banking. The connection with other United
States businesses and with the local customers of these
businesses creates the opportunity to internalize
information at a low cost.
Historically, as is stressed by Focarelli and Pozzolo
(2000, p.1, my italics), “the pattern of bank international
shareholdings followed that of economic integration
between countries: banks extended their activities
abroad in order to provide services to their home-
country clients in international transactions; afterwards,
with a growing understanding of the foreign market
(in particular of regulatory and institutional aspects)
and a developed network of relationships with local
financial institutions, some banks were induced to
increase the range of their operations and provide
services to the local population too. Although this
account is likely to be accurate in general (…) today
the actual pattern of bank international shareholdings
depends on a wider range of factors than just the overall
degree of economic integration between countries.” In
particular, Grubel’s theory of internalization cannot be
applied to the retail banking market, since the majority
of the retail customers of foreign banks have no
previous connection with the banks in their home
countries.
In the recent wave of banking internationalization,
financial institutions have not only continued to pursue
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their existing relationships, but also (and increasingly)
global banks have been seeking to widen their activities
in host-country financial markets, mainly by acquiring
controlling majority stakes or non-controlling minority
stakes. Thus, the present strategy of global universal
banks is aimed at diversifying their activities into certain
domestic financial markets by creating branch networks
and integrating more deeply into the local market,
whereas in the past multinational bank strategies were
geared mainly towards serving their home-country
(corporate) customers, while helping some local firms
to access the international financial market. To a great
extent, this new strategy has been stimulated by the
gradual easing or even, in some cases, the abolition of
legal restrictions on the presence of multinational banks
in local markets, in both developed and developing
countries (Freitas, 1999).
Few recent works have sought an expansionary
pattern behind the recent wave of banking
internationalization.2 One of the most common
explanations points to the increase in banking
competition caused by financial deregulation. As
margins and fees tighten in the domestic financial
services area, financial firms expand overseas in search
of higher returns. Thus, with banks’ net interest margins
under downward pressure owing to the increase of
banking competition, and with the big financial
institutions usually based in mature economies with low
growth potential, some banks are seeking to diversify
their activities geographically into markets with growth
potential and/or higher net interest margins. Generally
speaking, internationalization is a way for banks to
enhance their ability to generate profits as the minimum
scale required to remain competitive continues to
increase. Another explanation is that there are potential
risk-reduction gains from the diversification of income
that results from a multiplicity of products, client groups
and geographies in multi-activity financial services
organizations, and these gains increase with the number
of activities undertaken.
Overall, the empirical evidence in the literature
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1998; Claessens,
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1998) suggests that
foreign financial institutions are actually less efficient
than domestic institutions, except in developed
countries. To analyse this claim, Berger and others
(2000) considered two hypotheses:
i) Home field advantage hypothesis. According
to this hypothesis, domestic institutions are generally
more efficient than institutions from foreign nations.
Their advantages derive in part from organizational
diseconomies in operating or monitoring an institution
from a distance, examples of which include turf battles
between staff in different nations (affecting operations)
and possible difficulties in evaluating the behaviour and
effort of managers in a distant market (affecting
monitoring efforts). Besides these, other barriers
include differences in language, culture, currency and
regulatory or supervisory structures, and explicit or
implicit barriers against foreign institutions;
ii) Global advantage hypothesis. According to
this hypothesis, some efficiently managed foreign
institutions are able to overcome cross-border
disadvantages and operate more efficiently than
domestic institutions in other nations, as they attain
greater efficiency by spreading their superior
management skills or best-practice policies and
procedures over more resources, lowering operating
costs, or achieving risk diversification that allows
them to undertake higher expected return
investments.
Testing these hypotheses in five countries (France,
Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United
States) during the 1990s, Berger and others (2000)
found evidence for a limited form of global advantage,
according to which only efficient institutions in one
or a small number of nations with specific favourable
market or regulatory/supervisory conditions in their
home countries could operate more efficiently than
domestic institutions in other nations. This finding
suggests that some banking organizations can operate
in foreign countries at or above the efficiency levels
of domestic banks, paving the way for some additional
global consolidation. A study carried out by Focarelli
and Pozzolo (2000) shows in the same connection that
banks with cross-border shareholdings are larger and
have headquarters in countries with more developed
and efficient markets. Banks operating in countries
where the banking sector is larger and more profitable
should be able to export their superior skills and are
therefore more likely to expand their activities abroad.
Local market opportunities –a higher expected rate
of economic growth, more stable economic conditions
and banking inefficiency in the destination country–
are the main factors behind decisions by banks to
expand abroad. Banks prefer to invest in countries that
promise larger profits because economic growth is
expected to be higher and there is scope for improving
2 There are a few exceptions. See, for instance, Berger and others
(2000) and Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000).
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on the performance of inefficient local banks. Profit
opportunities in host markets have become a key factor
in determining the pattern of foreign bank
shareholdings, which may take varied forms: full
acquisition, targeted purchases of specific activities,
joint ventures or alliances with local banks.
III
Factors leading foreign banks to invest
in Latin America and Brazil
As the previous section shows, there are strong
empirical and analytical reasons to believe that the
process of consolidation in the banking industry is an
international phenomenon, driven by financial
deregulation and technological change. The new phase
of banking internationalization is a consequence of this
process, with financial institutions seeking to diversify
their activities –in terms of products and services and/or
geographical location– and increase their minimum
scale of operations to remain competitive and enhance
their ability to generate profits.
Banking crises, deregulation and the globalization
of financial services led to a significant increase in the
presence of foreign banks in emerging economies in
the second half of the 1990s.3 Banking consolidation
in these economies has accelerated recently,
transforming what was traditionally a highly protected
industry. In this connection, Hawkins and Mihaljek
(2001, p. 3) state that “global market and technology
developments, macroeconomic pressures and banking
crises in the 1990s have forced the banking industry
and the regulators to change the old way of doing
business, and to deregulate the banking industry at the
national level and open up financial markets to foreign
competition. (…) These changes have significantly
increased competitive pressures on banks in the
emerging economies and have led to deep changes in
the structure of the banking industry.”
The banking sector in Latin America (including
Brazil) was one of the largest recipients of foreign direct
investment (FDI) during the 1990s. However, the wave
of bank FDI cannot be understood in isolation from the
general influx of FDI into Latin America during the
1990s. The Latin America and Caribbean region
received record levels of FDI in that decade, with inflows
totalling US$ 76.7 billion in 1998 alone, or around 41%
of all FDI flows to developing countries. Again, 42% of
these inflows went to a single destination, Brazil, the
largest country in the region and, since 1996, the leading
Latin American FDI recipient and the second-largest
destination for FDI among developing countries (ECLAC,
2000, pp. 35-6).
Some of the main factors behind the expansion of
European banks in Latin America can be summarized
as follows:
• The banking sector restructuring process resulting
from European economic and monetary union
(EMU). For some European banks, expanding
abroad is not only a source of earnings
diversification, but also a way of strengthening their
position in the European banking market given the
increasingly competitive conditions facing banks
in the European Economic Area. The European
banks’ strategy for Latin America may be
interpreted as a response to this more competitive
environment, in which several factors had been
eroding income from traditional banking business
(Paula, 2002, chapter 2). Further, political and
regulatory constraints mean that there are some
impediments to mergers and acquisitions in EU
countries but incentives to such activity outside the
bloc.4 The preference for Latin America, and to a
3 In Central Europe, according to Hawkins and Mihaljek (2001,
p. 24), foreign banks now account for two thirds or more of both
assets and capital, making these countries’ banking systems among
the most open in the world, while in Latin America the market
share of foreign banks rose from an average of 7% at the beginning
of the 1990s to 40% in 2000.
4 One of these incentives is the absence of a single regulatory agency
in the European Union (EU). This has limited the benefits of
expanding areas of activity across borders and, at the same time,
prevented European banks from diversifying earnings and reducing
regulatory capital as has happened in the United States. Although
the Single Market Act and the various European Commission
financial directives should have created some uniformity, difficulties
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lesser degree Central and Eastern Europe, is partly
due to the fact that South-East Asia was in crisis
during the second half of the 1990s, while the
Indian and Chinese financial systems remained
closed to foreign banks, leaving Argentina, Brazil
and Mexico as the main big emerging markets open
to FDI in the banking sector.
• In particular, the dynamics of internationalization
among Spanish banks, since these have been the
main players in the recent wave of foreign bank
investment in Latin America. These banks pursued
growth strategies based on mergers and
acquisitions in their natural market before they
launched their international growth strategy.5 Thus,
they were already “mature” banks when they
decided to expand overseas. Indeed, with the
implementation of EMU and the prospect of euro
introduction, the larger Spanish banks –in
particular, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (BBV), Banco
Santander and Banco Central Hispano (BCH)– had
to look beyond their natural borders in search of
global markets, in order to maintain their
competitive position and defend themselves against
the threat of hostile bids by either local or foreign
competitors. In the initial stages of this process
there was a proliferation of alliances and
cooperation agreements with other financial
institutions, chiefly within the European Union,
while the second phase has involved a fast-paced,
aggressive expansion strategy aimed at the main
Latin American markets (ECLAC, 2000, p. 159).
During the 1990s, Dutch and German banks were
busy expanding into Central and Eastern Europe,
while American banks were occupied with mergers
and acquisitions in their own domestic market,
leaving Latin America –cultural linkages also
played their part– as the natural market for the
Spanish banks.
• The deregulation process that began in Latin
America in the early 1990s, in the broader context
of economic and political reform, made it possible
for foreign companies to enter key economic
sectors such as banking, telecommunications and
utilities. Bank privatization programmes generally
formed part of longer-term public-sector reforms,
which also involved privatization of major public
enterprises with the aim of consolidating the public
finances and cutting borrowing requirements
(Hawkins and Mihaljek, 2001, p. 13). Another
important motive was to deepen the role of the market.
• The valuations of Latin American companies,
including banks, are much lower than those of
European companies, making it easier to attain a
large market share at a lower cost. According to
Sebastian and Hernansanz (2000, p. 19), a 1% share
of the German deposit market would have cost US$
2,285 million in 1999, if attained by purchasing
shares in the major listed banks (i.e., Deutsche
Bank, Bayerische Hypo und Vereinsbank, Dresdner
Bank, Commerzbank and Bankgesellschaft
Berlin). The same share could have been obtained
for an outlay of US$ 196 million in Argentina and
US$ 205 million in Mexico.
• The Latin American banking market has much
greater growth potential than Europe’s mature
banking market. The size of the financial system
in terms of the ratio of M3 to gross domestic
product (GDP) is only 28% in Latin America, while
in the euro area it is 77% and in the United States
71% (Sebastian and Hernansanz, 2000, p. 18).
• The Latin American banking sector offers financial
institutions much better prospects for raising
returns, since the intermediation margins with
which banks operate in these countries are
considerably higher than in the developed world.
While domestic banks’ average margin on assets
(net interest income over total assets) in Latin
America was 5.76% for the period 1988-1995 (in
Brazil it was 6.6% and in Argentina 9.9%), in the
OECD countries it was 2.8% over the same period
(Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1998,
p.26). Again, Latin American banks steadily
improved their already high profitability during the
1990s, although net interest revenue was stable.
Their profitability is high compared both to the
G3 countries (Germany, Japan and the United
States) and other emerging countries (table 1).
have arisen and hampered cross-border operations. There are
multiple supervisory agencies in European countries and no
coordinating agency or single bank regulatory body for the entire
euro area. As a result, mergers and acquisitions remain largely
confined within national borders. See Kregel (2002) for further
details.
5 The expansion of Spanish banks into Latin America must also be
seen in a broader context, with the major Spanish service firms
(transport, telecommunications, energy and financial services)
deciding to expand abroad after a period of structural change in
the Spanish economy that was driven partly by the privatization of
State firms. Since 1994, Latin America has been the prime
investment destination in the international strategy of these firms,
with total investments from Spain jumping from US$ 4.5 billion in
1990 to over US$ 18.5 billion in 1998 (ECLAC, 2000, p. 133).
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• There is great potential for efficiency gains in Latin
America, since banking efficiency is generally
lower than in developed countries. Domestic banks’
ratio of operating costs to assets in Latin America
averaged 5.5% in 1992-1997, as against 1.7% in
the G3 countries, 1.6% in East Asia and 4.1% in
Central Europe in the same period (table 1). The
high operating costs (and high interest rate spreads)
of domestic banks in Latin America are in large
part the legacy of the high-inflation period of the
1980s and the early 1990s, when inflationary
revenues generated easy profits for the banks and,
consequently, there was little pressure to cut costs.
The previous section stressed that local market
opportunities (higher expected rates of economic
growth, more stable economic conditions and banking
inefficiency in the host country) are the main factor
leading banks to expand abroad. Accordingly, the main
domestic factors behind the recent influx of foreign
banks into Brazil were the more stable economic
conditions deriving from price stabilization since 1994
(which changed the long-term business landscape in
Brazil), higher expected rates of economic growth, and
the growth potential of the banking market. Besides,
since the early 1990s the Brazilian economy has been
undergoing a wide-ranging liberalization process that
has opened up previously restricted activities to foreign
investors. Thus, investment by foreign banks in the
country has followed a gradual easing of legal
restrictions on the presence of foreign companies in
the Brazilian banking sector. Article 52 of the temporary
provisions act of the 1988 Constitution prohibits foreign
financial institutions already established in the country
from setting up new agencies or increasing their stakes
in local financial institutions, until such time as a
complementary law is enacted. However, this
Constitution leaves open the possibility of foreign
institutions having access to the domestic market, since
article 52 also establishes that such restrictions do not
apply to authorizations deriving from international
agreements, reciprocity or decisions made in the
interests of the Brazilian Government (Puga, 1999).
A particularly important change occurred in 1995,
when a banking crisis was triggered by the tighter
monetary policy and rising interest rates resulting from
the 1994-1995 Mexican crisis. According to Carvalho
(2000, p. 148), “the banking crisis of 1995 opened a
window of opportunity for foreign banks to set foot in
the country. The crisis devalued the existing banks,
putting a larger number of them under the control of
the central bank, without compromising, it seemed,
long-term possibilities for the industry. In a report dated
December 1998, the Central Bank of Brazil identified
104 financial institutions as going through some kind
of ‘adjustment’ between the launching of the Real Plan
and that date”.
The recent process of banking consolidation in
Brazil is in some ways similar to the Mexican
experience, in the sense that in both countries the
authorities responded to the banking crisis with an array
of support programmes for financial institutions and
their borrowers. These programmes were intended to
bolster the health of the financial sector while at the
same time opening it up to foreign banks, in the hope
TABLE 1
Selected regions and countries: Banking sector performance
(As percentage of total assets)
East Asiaa Latin Americab Central Europec G3d
1992- 1998 1999 1992- 1998 1999 1992- 1998 1999 1992- 1998 1999
1997 1997 1997 1997
Net interest revenue 2.6 1.8 2.2 5.2 5.3 5.4 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.0 1.8 2.0
Other income 0.7 1.2 0.8 2.3 2.0 1.8 2.3 2.1 2.0 0.7 0.8 1.0
Operating costs 1.6 2.4 2.3 5.5 5.5 5.7 4.1 3.5 3.1 1.7 1.6 1.8
Loan losses 0.6 6.3 1.8 1.2 1.1 1.7 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.3
Pre-tax profits 0.8 -5.5 -0.7 1.4 1.3 2.4 0.5 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.8
Source: Hawkins and Mihaljek (2001, p. 6).
a Simple average of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea and Thailand.
b Simple average of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
c Simple average of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
d Simple average of Germany, Japan and United States.
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that the presence of the latter would help strengthen
the banking sector.6 The entry of foreign banks was
also used as a policy to weaken the effect of local
monopolies that had been established under the
previous regulatory structure.
In this context, the Brazilian government allowed
some foreign banks to enter the country to take over
certain problem banks, such as Excel-Econômico and
Bamerindus, and also to strengthen the domestic
banking sector. Legislative Intent (“Exposição de
Motivos”) no. 311 of 23 August 1995 allowed the
President to authorize the entrance of foreign banks
into Brazil on a case-by-case basis. On that occasion,
the Brazilian Government announced that foreign banks
would not be allowed to open new branches or acquire
smaller banks unless they purchased one of the troubled
banks. The norm pronounces that the entrance of
foreign banks is in the country’s interests, and
emphasizes the following favourable aspects:
• Improvements in the operational efficiency of the
banking sector, with positive effects on bank
intermediation.
• Increased banking competition, which would lead
to lower spreads and banking fees, with positive
effects on lending interest rates.
• Diversification and improvement of the supply of
financial services, with lower costs.
• Introduction of new management technologies and
innovations in products and services.
Thus, with greater flexibility in the regulatory
framework governing the entry of foreign banks, the
Brazilian Government let in a large number of these, in
line with the international tendency towards the
expansion of financial conglomerates seeking new
markets for their businesses. Another factor that
attracted foreign banks to Brazil was the privatization
programme for State-owned banks. The programme of
incentives for the restructuring of the State public
financial system (PROES) was established in August
1996 by temporary measure 1,514. It forms part of a
comprehensive process of State fiscal adjustment and
debt restructuring. Under PROES arrangements, the
federal Government finances the restructuring of State
banks (Maia, 2000).
Taken together, the changes in the regulatory
framework for foreign banks, the privatization
programme for State-owned banks, price stabilization
since 1994, the growing potential of the Brazilian retail
banking market, the (still nascent) development of
pension funds and a securities market in Brazil and the
increasing integration of the Brazilian economy into
trade and financial flows have all had the effect of
attracting foreign capital into the Brazilian banking
sector.
IV
The recent wave of European bank
investment in Brazil
The recent wave of mergers and acquisitions (M&As)
in the Brazilian banking sector began with takeovers
of failing banks by solvent ones, typified by the
acquisition of Nacional by Unibanco, Econômico by
Excel, and Bamerindus by HSBC. Furthermore, bank
takeovers increasingly involved a strong bidder and
sometimes a weak but not yet insolvent target, examples
being the acquisition of Banco de Crédito Nacional
(BCN) by Banco Brasileiro de Desconto (Bradesco),
Noroeste by Santander and Real by ABN Amro.
The M&A wave in Brazil involved different
movements. Four large domestic private-sector banks
(Bamerindus, Econômico, Real and Noroeste) were
acquired by foreign institutions (HSBC, BBVA, ABN Amro
and BSCH, respectively). Conversely, some foreign
banks sold their local operations to domestic banks:
BNP Paribas sold Banco Francês e Brasileiro to Itau
6 See Dages, Goldberg and Kinney (2000) for an analysis of recent
foreign bank penetration in Mexico and Argentina. According to a
report on Brazilian banks (Gazeta Mercantil, 1999), in November
1995 the Brazilian federal Government launched a programme
called PROER to finance the absorption of problem banks by healthy
ones. Financing was provided under this scheme for the acquisition
of seven banks: Nacional, taken over by Unibanco (a Brazilian
bank); Econômico by Excel (Brazilian); Mercantil de Pernambuco
by Banco Rural (Brazilian); Banco Antonio de Queiroz by Banco
United (Brazilian); Banorte by Bandeirantes (Brazilian); Banco
Martinelli by Pontual (Brazilian); and Bamerindus by HSBC
(British).
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and Caixa Geral de Depositos sold Banco Bandeirantes
to Unibanco, while Crédit Agricole and Espirito Santo
sold Boavista to Bradesco. One big state bank, Banco
do Estado de São Paulo (Banespa), was acquired by
BSCH, while several medium-sized state banks were
purchased by the country’s two largest private-sector
banks, with Bradesco buying Credireal and Itau buying
Banco do Estado de Rio de Janeiro (Banerj), Banco do
Estado de Minas Gerais (Bemge), Banco do Estado de
Goiás (BEG) and Banestado.
Table 2 lists M&As in the Brazilian banking sector
during the period 1995-2000. It shows that:
TABLE 2
Brazil: Main mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector, 1995-2002
Year Acquirer Acquirer’s country of origin Institution acquired
2002 Bradesco Brazil Mercantil de São Paulo
Bradesco Brazil Banco Ford
2001 Itau Brazil Banco do Estado de Goiás (BEG)




 BSCH Spain Meridional/Bozano, Simonsen
1999 Bradesco Brazil Banco do Estado da Bahia (Baneb)
Bradesco/BCN Brazil Pontual
1998 ABN Amro Netherlands Banco Real
ABN Amro Netherlands Banco do Estado de Pernambuco
Itau Brazil Bemge
Unibanco Brazil Dibens
Sudameris (Intesa/Crédit Agricole) Italy/France/Brazil America do Sul
Chase Manhattan United States Patrimonio
Bradesco Brazil Pontual
CSFB Switzerland Banco Garantia
BBVA Spain Excel-Econômico
 Caixa Geral de Depositos Portugal Bandeirantes
1997 Santander Spain Banco Noroeste
Banco Interatlantico Portugal/France Boavista
Santander Spain Banco Geral de Comercio
Itau Brazil Banerj
Bradesco Brazil BCN/Credireal
HSBC United Kingdom Bamerindus
Bozano, Simonsen Brazil Meridional
Robert Fleming United Kingdom Graphus
NationsBank United States Liberal
American Express United States SRL
Banco de Crédito Nacional (BCN) Brazil Credireal
Lloyds United Kingdom Multiplic/Losango
Unibanco Brazil Fininvest (50%)
Icatu Brazil Fininvest (50%)
1996 Banco de Crédito Nacional Brazil Itamarati
Banque National de Paris France Banco Comercial de São Paulo
BBA Creditanstalt Brazil/Austria Financiadora Mappin
Itau Brazil Banco Francês e Brasileiro
Itamarati Brazil Crefisul
Excel Brazil Econômico
1995 Unibanco Brazil Nacional
 Pontual Brazil Digibanco
Source: Prepared by the author with information from Chase Manhattan Bank (2000) and the Central Bank of Brazil.
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i) Foreign banks (overwhelmingly European)
were the dominant force in major acquisitions until
2000, followed closely by the large domestic private-
sector banks. By contrast with neighbouring Argentina,
where foreign bank acquisitions included two of the
three largest private-sector banks, foreign acquisitions
in Brazil mainly involved medium-sized banks. This
partly reflects the prohibitively high market
capitalization of the very largest banks.
ii) The principal foreign acquisitions, in terms of
size, were the purchase of Bamerindus by HSBC (which
was paradigmatic since it involved a big domestic retail
bank for the first time), Excel/Econômico by BBVA,
America do Sul by Sudameris, Banco Noroeste by
Santander, Banco Real by ABN Amro and Banespa by
BSCH. This last acquisition was the largest of recent
years in Brazil, since it involved the purchase of a bank
with assets worth around US$ 15 billion and made
Banco Santander do Brasil the third largest private-
sector bank in Brazil and the fifth largest overall,
including State-owned banks. Banespa has a strong
retail network, mainly in the state of São Paulo, the
country’s richest, but it also has high overheads. Its
acquisition was something of a turning point in the
history of BSCH in Brazil, since prior to the Banespa
acquisition in November 2000 Santander do Brasil’s
relatively modest investments in Meridional and the
prestigious investment bank Bozano, Simonsen left the
group still locked out of the market elite, as it ranked
only seventh in the banking industry.7
iii) The big American banks already established in
Brazil –Citibank and BankBoston– did not participate
in the M&A wave but opted to grow organically in the
Brazilian banking market, where they have traditionally
focused on a smaller and more select clientele.8 The
recent strategy of these banks in Brazil has been to
increase their customer base, bringing in segments of
the middle class and medium-sized firms. BankBoston
has sought to operate in a more select segment of the
retail market, with clients being required to have a
monthly income of over 4,000 reais, while Citibank
has sought to extend its customer base to lower
segments of the middle class (those with monthly
incomes of over 1,000 reais) and firms with annual
revenues of over 5 million reais. The inactivity of United
States banks in the recent M&A wave in Brazil can be
partly explained by the good returns they have obtained
by supplying new products in their own domestic
market, where they have been able to expand
geographically thanks to deregulation of the financial
system. Diversification abroad, and specifically in Latin
America, thus came to play only a secondary role in
the overall strategy of American banks, with the possible
exception of Mexico, which has strong linkages with
the American economy via the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and where Citibank recently
bought Grupo Financiero Banamex-Accival (Banacci)
and became the leader in the Mexican banking sector.
iv) The three largest domestic private-sector banks
–Bradesco, Itau and Unibanco– have reacted to the
penetration of foreign banks by participating actively
in the M&A process with some important purchases,
such as that of Nacional and Bandeirantes by Unibanco,
BCN/Credireal and Mercantil de São Paulo by Bradesco,
and Banerj and Bemge by Itau. Itau in particular has
been a major acquirer of state banks, such as Banestado
(Paraná), Banerj (Rio de Janeiro), Bemge (Minas
Gerais) and BEG (Goiás). The reaction of Unibanco and
Itau –both smaller than Bradesco, the largest private-
sector bank– was partly defensive, as they used
acquisitions/mergers to maintain their market share and
leadership in the banking market and avoid being taken
over themselves.9 It is worth noting that Bradesco and
Itau have been more aggressive in their acquisitions
since end-2001, taking advantage of the interruption
of foreign banking sector investment in Latin America
due to the Argentine crisis. Bradesco has purchased part
of Banco Ford (leasing and consumer credit) for 1
billion reais and Mercantil de São Paulo, a medium-
sized bank with strong roots in São Paulo state, for 1.4
billion reais, while Itau has acquired BEG for 665 million
reais. The acquisition of Mercantil de São Paulo by
Bradesco was particularly important since the latter was
one of the country’s top 20 private-sector banks.
The growing presence of foreign banks in Brazil
is confirmed by the available data. In terms of market
share, banks controlled by foreign financial groups
raised their share of total banking sector assets almost
fourfold in just six years, from 7.2% in 1994 and 12.8%
in 1997 to 27.4% in 2000, while the participation of all
other segments,10 especially State-owned banks,
7 The Meridional group (Banco Meridional and Bozano, Simonsen)
was bought by BSCH for close to US$ 1 billion, while Banespa was
bought for US$ 3.7 billion, a sum five times higher than its book
value.
8 Recent acquisitions of local banks or branches in Latin America
by BankBoston and, particularly, Citibank suggest that these banks’
strategies may be changing.
9 See Paula (2002b) for more information on the reaction of
domestic private-sector banks in Brazil.
10 With the exception of credit cooperatives, whose market share is
negligible.
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declined (table 3). The rise of foreign banks in Brazil
was mainly at the expense of domestic private-sector
banks and, to a lesser extent, state and federally-owned
banks.11 Although the relative share of the public-sector
(state and federal) banks segment –including that of
the two “giants”, Caixa Econômica Federal and Banco
do Brasil– has tended to decline, as of end-2000 they
still led the market with 36.6% of total assets, followed
closely by the domestic private-sector banks (35.2%).
For their part, the major domestic private-sector banks
have increased their market share in the banking sector
through M&As involving state and private-sector banks
and, to some extent, through organic growth.
Consequently, the banking sector market share (as a
proportion of total public- and private-sector bank
assets) of the top four domestic private-sector banks –
Bradesco, Itau, Unibanco and Safra– increased from
23.7% in 1999 to 27.6% in 2000, a significant increase
of 3.9 percentage points in just one year (table 4). The
market share of these banks doubtless increased further
after the recent acquisitions by Itau and Bradesco.
Furthermore, the major Brazilian domestic banks
are regional leaders in Latin America, something that
reflects both the size of the country’s economy and the
dynamism that enabled Brazilian banks to survive and
even expand during the period of high inflation. In 1999,
eight of the 15 largest domestic banks in Latin America
were Brazilian (table 5), including the top four (two
public-sector banks and two private-sector banks). Table
4 also shows that seven of the 12 largest private-sector
banks in Brazil are owned by foreign institutions,
including five top European banks, namely HSBC, ABN
Amro, Santander (BSCH), Sudameris and BBV Banco
(BBVA), and two American banks, Citibank and
BankBoston, part of Citicorp and FleetBoston groups,
respectively. By end-2000, the top 12 private-sector
banks accounted for around 40% of total banking assets
(including federal and state banks) and 78.3% of total
private-sector banking assets. In December 2000, the
five big domestic private-sector banks (Bradesco, Itau,
Unibanco, Safra and BBA) had 28.8% of total assets
between them, while the seven big foreign banks had
21.1%. Domestic private-sector banks are still
hegemonic in Brazil, therefore, although the relative
share of foreign banks has increased a great deal in
recent years. If the large Latin American countries are
compared, it transpires that the market share of foreign
banks is much smaller in Brazil than in Argentina and
Mexico.12
TABLE 3
Brazil: Share of total banking sector assets controlled by different
financial institutions, 1993-2000
(Percentages)
Institution 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Foreign-controlled banks 8.35 7.16 8.39 9.79 12.82 18.38 23.19 27.4
Private-sector domestic banks 40.67 41.21 39.16 39 36.76 35.29 33.11 35.2
Public-sector banks
(+Caixa estadual)a 13.41 18.17 21.9 21.92 19.06 11.37 10.23 5.6
Caixa Econômica Federal 14.51 14.98 16.4 16.47 16.57 17.02 17.06 15.4
Banco do Brasil 22.93 18.28 13.91 12.52 14.42 17.44 15.7 15.6
Credit cooperatives 0.13 0.2 0.24 0.3 0.37 0.5 0.7 0.8
Banking sector 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Central Bank of Brazil (2002).
a Excluding the two big federal banks, Caixa Econômica Federal and Banco do Brasil.
11 The term “state banks” is used in this section to refer to banks
whose main owners are the governments of Brazilian states, while
“federal banks” are those whose main owner is the federal
government.
12 According to Correa (2002, p. 11), the percentage share of total
banking sector assets held by foreign banks was 48.6% in Argentina
(1999) and 80% in Mexico (2001), while in Brazil, according to
our data (see table 3), the 2000 figure was 27.4%.
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TABLE 4
Brazil: Share of total banking sector assets controlled by the top 20
banking conglomerates, 1999-2000a
(Millions of reais and percentages of total banking sector assets)
Banking conglomerate Ownershipb  Millions of reais % of total assets % of total assets
 (2000) (2000) (1999)
Banco do Brasil FE  128 486 15.99 17.78
CEF FE  126 080 15.69 17.01
Bradesco+BCN+Credireal+Baneb+Boavista DP  87 503 10.89 10.10
Itau+Bemge+Banestado+Banerj DP  67 757 8.43 6.74
Santander+Banespa FO  53 103 6.61 2.95
Unibanco+Bandeirantes+Credibanco+Dibens DP  43 605 5.43 4.41
ABN Amro Real+Bandepe FO  29 809 3.71 3.31
Safra DP  22 632 2.82 2.45
BankBoston FO  22 425 2.79 2.60
HSBC FO  20 942 2.61 2.55
Citibank FO  20 184 2.51 1.94
Nossa Caixa ST  18 475 2.30 2.15
Sudameris+América do Sul FO  15 332 1.91 1.95
BBA Creditanstalt DP  10 451 1.30 1.26
BBV FO  8 122 1.01 0.96
Banrisul ST  7 723 0.96 0.88
Votorantim DP  7 483 0.93 …
Mercantil de São Paulo DP  6 935 0.86 0.77
Lloyds TSB FO  6 917 0.86 …
Chase Manhattan FO  5 329 0.66 …
Source: Prepared by the author with data from the Central Bank of Brazil.
a The table includes only deposit-taking institutions in Brazil (commercial banks, multiple banks and caixas).
b FE: federal bank; DP: domestic private-sector bank (more than 50% of shares in domestic hands); FO: foreign bank; ST: State-owned bank.
TABLE 5
Latin America: Top 15 banks, 1999a
Ranking Bank Country Total assets
(millions of dollars)
1 Banco do Brasil Brazil 70 684
2 Caixa Econômica Federal Brazil 68 441
3 Banco Bradescob Brazil 60 199
4 Banco Itauc Brazil 33 241
5 Banco Nacional de México (Banamex) Mexico 32 498
6 Bancomer Mexico 27 497
7 Unibanco Brazil 20 121
8 Banca Serfin Mexico 19 055
9 Banco de la Nación Argentina Argentina 17 751
10 Banespa Brazil 15 617
11 Banco Internacional (Bital) Mexico 13 248
12 Banco de Galicia Argentina 12 519
13 Banco Safra Brazil 10 077
14 Banco del Estado de Chile Chile 9 400
15 Nossa Caixa - Nosso Banco Brazil 8 635
Source: Euromoney, 2000.
a Total assets criterion.
b Including Credireal, BCN and Baneb.
c Including Bemge, BFB and Banerj.
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V
The expansion strategies of the major
european banks: BSCH, BBVA, HSBC and ABN Amro
overseas income represented more than 35% of these
banks’ total revenues (Nellis, McCaffery and
Hutchinson, 2000, p. 57), and this relative share has
increased in the case of the Spanish banks, owing to
their recent acquisitions in Latin America.
All these financial groups are seeking to expand
their activities in Europe, examples being HSBC in
France14 and ABN Amro in Italy. They also have a
presence in other Latin American countries, but it is an
uneven one, as table 6 shows. The total assets of the 20
largest foreign banks in the region are largely accounted
for by just three banks, BSCH, Citibank and BBVA, which
owned 44.8% of all foreign bank assets in Latin America
in 1998 (ECLAC, 2000, p. 61). Interestingly, these are
among the few banks in the world to have achieved
leading positions outside their natural markets. They
have increased their market share further since 1998
with the acquisition of some large local banks, examples
being the takeovers of Bancomer by BBVA (June 2000),
Serfin (May 2000) and Banespa (November 2000) by
BSCH, and Banacci (May 2001) by Citigroup.15
Furthermore, they are the only banks with an extensive
network of branches in the region’s six largest countries.
Although ABN Amro has investments in various Latin
American countries, it is only in Brazil that it has a
relatively important presence, particularly since it
purchased Banco Real in 1998. HSBC assets are
concentrated in the three main countries of Latin
America: Mexico, Brazil and Argentina.
Table 6 also shows that Citibank (part of Citigroup)
became the second biggest foreign bank in Latin
As we saw in section III, Grubel’s theory of
internalization does not apply to the recent wave of
multinational bank expansion into the retail banking
markets of emerging countries. This is certainly the case
with the European banks –BSCH, BBVA, HSBC and ABN
Amro– that expanded into Brazil during the 1990s by
buying local retail banks, since most of their customers
are Brazilian, i.e., do not have any previous connection
with the parent firms in the home countries of these
banking groups.
According to Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000), banks
operating in countries with larger, more profitable
banking sectors should be able to export their superior
skills and should thus be more likely to expand their
activities abroad. Indeed, all the biggest European banks
in Latin America –BSCH, BBVA, HSBC and ABN Amro–
have recently increased market share in their home
countries through mergers and acquisitions, attaining
leading (or at least important) positions in these
markets.13 Expanding abroad is not only a source of
earnings diversification for these banks, but also a way
to strengthen their position in the European banking
market under the competitive pressure of economic and
monetary union.
There are some common and some distinctive
features in the strategies of the biggest European banks
in Latin America. One obvious common feature is that
all of the top four are big universal banks that chose to
invest abroad as a business expansion strategy. In 1997,
13 To mention only the more recent and important M&As involving
these banks, HSBC bought Midland in 1992, lifting the group’s total
assets from £86 billion in 1991 to over £170 billion in 1992 and
creating one of the largest financial organizations of its kind in the
world; ABN merged with Amro in 1991 and took the lead in the
banking market of the Netherlands; Santander merged with Banco
Central Hispano (itself the product of a merger between Banco
Central and Hispano) in 1999, becoming the largest Spanish
financial group; subsequently, BBV (the product of a merger between
Bilbao and Vizcaya) merged with Argentaria, forming the second
largest Spanish financial group. Thus, the Spanish banking sector
became one of the most highly concentrated in Europe, forming a
sort of duopoly as the market share of the two largest institutions
grew from 33% in 1987 to 50% in 1996 (ECLAC, 2000, p.158). This
proportion has recently grown even further.
14 According to HSBC’s Annual Review (HSBC, 2000, p. 3), acquisition
of the French bank Crédit Commercial de France (CCF) “was a major
step forward for our wealth management strategy and gives us a
substantial platform in the euro zone”. Indeed, with 692 branches,
CCF is one of the largest banks in France.
15 In 2000-2001, Mexico saw a sweeping reorganization of foreign
banking operations that sharply altered its financial system, with
BSCH acquiring Grupo Serfin for US$ 1.56 billion, BBVA putting up
US$ 1.85 billion to merge its Mexican operations with Grupo
Bancomer, and Citibank acquiring Grupo Banacci, Mexico’s
leading financial institution, in a transaction totalling US$ 12.5
billion.
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America after purchasing Mexico’s leading financial
institution, Banacci. Although Citibank has been present
in all the major Latin American countries for a long
time, only in Mexico does it have market leadership.
Historically, only Citibank and, more recently, HSBC
have pursued a global retail banking strategy by
establishing a presence in different countries and
continents, although they have tended to focus on credit
card and banking services for an urban professional
class without attempting, at least until Citibank’s recent
acquisition of Banacci group, to enter the mass retail
market as the Spanish banks have been doing. Their
businesses in Latin America thus have a quite different
focus from those of the Spanish banks, as Guillén and
Tschoegl (1999, p.10) emphasize: “The Spaniards are
competing in the lower and middle-income (LMI)
markets where they come into competition with the
largest domestic banks. The only foreign bank that had
previously made forays into Latin America comparable
in its geographic scope was Citibank. By contrast to
the Spanish banks, Citibank traditionally focused on
the upper-income market, frequently referred to as the
A, B, and C1 segments.”
The really big European investors in Latin America
are the two large Spanish banks, BSCH and BBVA, which
have recently developed an aggressive strategy of
expansion in the region. Between them, they have more
than US$ 170 billion of assets in Latin America,
representing about 55.8% of the total assets of the top
six foreign banks in the region (table 6). After
purchasing Banco Serfin in Mexico and Banespa in
Brazil, BSCH became the largest private-sector bank in
the region, with assets of more than US$ 100 billion. It
is also the leading foreign bank in Argentina, Brazil
and Chile, while BBVA is the leader in Colombia and
Venezuela and ranks second in Mexico. The difference
between BSCH and BBVA in terms of total assets in Latin
America is due mainly to Brazil, where BSCH recently
bought Banespa while BBVA has only a small market
share.
ABN Amro in the Netherlands and BSCH and BBVA
in Spain achieved substantial growth in their domestic
markets by pursuing M&A-based strategies aimed at
attaining leadership positions at home. This policy
allowed them to increase their competitiveness and
reach the size necessary for them to expand abroad.
After (or while) consolidating their position in their
domestic markets they extended their operations in
other countries, probably preparing themselves for an
increase in European competition as a result of
economic and monetary union. ABN Amro, BSCH and
BBVA are large banks in highly concentrated small or
medium-sized systems that are increasingly expanding
their operations into other geographical markets, since
domestic alternatives are limited.
Although the structural constraints were (and are)
in some ways similar for all European banks, and these
constraints were determinants in the international
expansion of some financial groups, each group has its
own distinct business philosophy and distinct
internationalization strategy.
HSBC is one of the largest banking and financial
services organizations in the world. Like Citigroup,
HSBC Group is a global universal bank with around
TABLE 6
Latin America: Largest foreign banks by assets, September 2000
(Millions of dollars)
Bank Origin Argentina Brazil Mexico Chile Colombia Venezuela Total %
BSCHa Spain  26 130  28 682  20 100  30 200  1 376  2 556  109 044  33.99
Citibankb United States  10 429  8 798  42 590  6 350  1 137  686  69 990  21.81
BBVA Spain  9 174  5 004  37 300  4 900  2 811  3 700  62 889  19.60
BankBoston United States  11 350  9 315  358  6 800  108  27 931  8.71
HSBC United Kingdom  5 016  9 126  15 202  29 344  9.15
ABN Amro Netherlands  2 801  15 581  154  2 900  110  95  21 641  6.75
Total   64 900  76 506 115 704  51 150  5 542  7 037  320 839  100.00
Source: Prepared by the author with data from Sebastian and Hernansanz (2000, p.37), Banco Santander (2002) and Gazeta Mercantil
(2001).
a Including Banespa, with data from September 2000.
b Including Banacci, with data from December 2000.
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9,500 offices in 79 countries and territories in Europe,
the Asia-Pacific region, the Americas, the Middle East
and Africa. The group moved its domicile from Hong
Kong to London only recently, in 1992, after the
Midland acquisition. HSBC is still strongly rooted in
Asia, in spite of its worldwide presence. However, this
has been changing over the last decade. Its strategy of
“managing for value” emphasizes the group’s balance
of business and earnings between the older, mature
markets and faster-growing emerging markets.16 In
2000, the group made 48.2% of its profits in Asia, 39%
in Europe, 9.6% in North America and 3.2% in Latin
America (HSBC, 2000). The recent expansion into Latin
America, like other investments in different regions,
seems to have been motivated by the strategy of risk
diversification through geographical diversification to
make the bank less dependent upon Asia. It is interesting
to note that HSBC itself significantly toned down its
plans to challenge local market leaders, bombastically
announced when it took over Bamerindus in Brazil.
The original, aggressive talk from HSBC officials about
occupying all market niches and reducing the price of
bank services across the board has given way to the
more cautious view that price wars would damage
everyone (Carvalho, 2000, p. 160).
ABN Amro’s two most important markets are
outside the Netherlands. These are the United States
Midwest and Brazil, but the group has a presence in a
number of countries around the world. According to
its 2000 annual report, North America contributed 44%
of group profits outside the Netherlands, and Latin
America and the Caribbean 24.1%. These data reveal
the importance of North and Latin America for the
group’s earnings outside the Netherlands. In 2000, the
ABN Amro board of directors decided that the bank
would operate in the retail market only in the
Netherlands, the United States and Brazil, the strategy
being to end these operations in countries where the
group was not large enough to compete. Accordingly,
the Dutch bank sold its retail commercial banking units
in nine countries, including Argentina, Ecuador,
Morocco and Sri Lanka. Recently, it announced that it
was going to sell its commercial banking subsidiaries
in Chile (to BankBoston), Kenya (to Citigroup) and
Venezuela (to Banco del Caribe) (Gazeta Mercantil,
2001, p. B2). ABN Amro has traditionally been a
universal bank, combining commercial, corporate,
private and investment banking. In Brazil, before the
purchase of Banco Real, which was the Dutch group’s
largest acquisition to date and the largest ever in
Brazil,17 ABN Amro concentrated on private and
corporate banking and to a lesser degree on retail
banking, although its largest source of earnings was
automobile financing. Thus, by purchasing Banco Real,
a big retail bank, ABN Amro became a truly universal
bank in Brazil, with different lines of business and the
ability to compete with the large local retail banks. The
operation allowed ABN Amro to consolidate its strategy
of specializing in Latin American pension fund
management and personal insurance, areas where
Banco Real was strong. To counter competition from
foreign banks locally, the bank is pursuing a fairly
aggressive expansion strategy through organic growth,
involving an extension of its branch network and
acquisition of small, healthy banking franchises.
The Spanish banks BSCH and BBVA have the
advantages of experience in dealing with instability
owing to Spain’s recent history, greater cultural
affinities with Latin America, and some familiarity with
the region, as most of the big Spanish banks have had
offices, branches or small subsidiaries in Latin America
since the 1970s or early 1980s. Both groups are mainly
concentrated in Spain and in Latin America18 where,
together with Citicorp, Banco Santander, Banco Bilbao
Vizcaya and Banco Central Hispano, they have been
the largest foreign banks since 1995. Interestingly, while
BSCH is the largest foreign bank in Brazil, with a 6.61%
market share (total assets criterion) in 2000, BBVA has
only a modest share of about 1% in Latin America’s
largest market. One possible explanation for the more
cautious approach of BBVA since expanding overseas
is that the group is consolidating its activities and
seeking to cut costs and increase efficiency throughout
the BBVA system, including Latin America.
The long-term approach of the Spanish banks
meant that they continued to expand their presence in
Latin America despite the financial turbulence of 1997-
1999, in contrast with other foreign financial institutions
16 The 1999 acquisition of Republic New York Corporation and
Safra Republic Holdings reinforced HSBC’s presence in some highly
developed countries, namely the United States, Switzerland and
Luxembourg.
17 In July 1998, ABN Amro purchased a 40% stake in Banco Real
for US$ 2.2 billion. Banco Real was the fourth biggest domestic
private-sector bank in Brazil. It also acquired two state banks: Banco
do Estado de Pernambuco (1998) and Paraiban (2002), both of
which have a large presence in the north-east of Brazil.
18 In 2000, BSCH obtained 34% of total net income from Latin
America, which accounted for 37% of group assets (The Banker,
2001, p. 69), while in the same year BBVA had 32.6% of its assets in
Latin America, according to its 2000 annual report.
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that chose to pull out of the region. They have been
very active in marketing new deposit products such as
lottery-linked accounts, sometimes without waiting for
them to be fully regulated, which testifies to their
capacity for innovation. This has enabled them to
respond more dynamically to the challenges of the Latin
American banking market, bringing in banking skills
that have served them primarily in the mass retail market
of their home country. Latin America became an
important strategic market for the Spanish banks as they
sought to offset the decline of net interest income in
Spain resulting from the lower interest rates that came
with EMU convergence. To sustain and support a
competitive position that would enable them to ward
off hostile bids from competitors, they looked beyond
their own borders for new markets (Calderón and
Casilda, 2000, p. 76).
The two Spanish banks did not just focus on
commercial banking but diversified into other financial
activities that included investment banking, insurance
and, in particular, pension fund management, so that
by 1999 they controlled between them 45% of the
private pension fund market in Latin America. The
recent penetration of Spanish banks in Latin America
is ground-breaking in that “rather than playing the
traditional role of working alongside non-financial firms
as they further their internationalization process
(providing financing and financial services to such
firms), [they] have aggressively expanded their core
activity –commercial banking– with a view to building
a presence in as many markets as possible” (ECLAC,
2000, p. 164). The other novelty is that they “are
acquiring some of the largest domestic banks in their
target countries and entering the general commercial
and mass retail market” (Guillén and Tschoegl, 1999,
p. 3).
Broadly speaking, while the two major Spanish
banks are similar in terms of age, size and their focus
on retail banking, they differ in terms of control,
management style and strategic posture. Consequently,
they have followed slightly different strategies in Latin
America, although in both cases the aim is to dominate
as many national markets as possible. Indeed, Banco
Santander (and later BSCH) has sought to attain a strong,
homogenous presence in Latin America. The group’s
emphasis in the region has been on banks that are strong
in investment banking and on the acquisition from the
outset of shareholdings large enough to provide both
ownership and full management control. It has generally
put its brand on the banks purchased.19 According to
Guillén and Tschoegl (1999, pp. 14 and 15), “Santander
has been most assertive about its Latin American
expansion primarily because of its strong capital base,
prior investment banking experience in the region, and
the strong personality and leadership of its chairman –
who likes to make expeditious and far-reaching
decisions. Numerous press reports confirm the contrast
between Santander’s ‘presidencialista’ style and BBV’s
‘team style’ of management, which our interviewees
singled out as a key difference between the two banks.”
As for BBV (later BBVA), its expansion was initially
based on small shareholdings or minority stakes
(providing the project was large enough) and on
partnerships with local banks, which were then
gradually built up over time. Although this approach
has not always ensured ownership, the bank has
progressively gained a greater degree of management
control over companies in the group. More recently,
the strategy of BBVA seems to be to consolidate M&As
already done, with a view to cutting costs and improving
efficiency in the group as a whole.
19 Before its merger with Banco Santander, Banco Central Hispano
focused its Latin American strategy on the acquisition of majority
stakes in association with a strategic partner, which in most cases
was left to manage the business.
VI
Conclusions
In the recent wave of banking internationalization,
financial institutions have not just followed up their
existing relationships –serving mainly home-country
customers– but have integrated more deeply into local
markets. Therefore, although the pattern of international
bank shareholdings has historically followed that of
economic integration between countries, the actual
pattern of expansion today depends on a wider range
of factors than just the degree of overall integration. In
this connection, Grubel’s theory of internalization –
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which states that the ability to draw on information and
personal contacts between banks and a manufacturing
firm’s parent in a foreign country at very low cost is
the main source of comparative advantage for
multinational banks– does not apply to the recent wave
of foreign bank expansion in the retail banking markets
of emerging countries. This at least was typically the
case in Latin America and Brazil in the 1990s, as the
customers of some European banks –BSCH, BBVA, HSBC
and ABN Amro– were mainly local and had no previous
connection with the banks’ parents firms in their home
countries.
Furthermore, the recent process of banking
internationalization has to be understood in the broader
context of Latin American deregulation in the 1990s,
which created an opportunity for foreign companies to
enter key sectors of the economy such as banking,
telecommunications and utilities. This was due both to
the privatization of State-owned companies, including
banks, and to the easing of legal restrictions on the
presence of foreign banks in domestic banking sectors.
According to Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000), banks
operating in countries where the banking sector is larger
and more profitable should be in a position to export
their superior skills, and should thus be more likely to
expand their activities abroad. Indeed, all the biggest
European banks in Latin America –BSCH, BBVA, HSBC
and ABN Amro– have recently increased their market
share at home through mergers and acquisitions,
attaining leading (or important) positions in these
markets. Expanding abroad is not only a source of
earnings diversification for these banks, but also a way
to strengthen their position in the European banking
market under the competitive pressure of economic and
monetary union.
There are some common features in the strategies
of the biggest European banks in Latin America. ABN
Amro in the Dutch market, and BSCH and BBVA in the
Spanish market, grew substantially by following merger
and acquisition-based expansion strategies in their
domestic markets with a view to positioning themselves
as leaders there. This policy allowed them to increase
their competitiveness and grow large enough to expand
internationally. Thus, after consolidating their position
in the domestic market they extended their operations
abroad, probably preparing themselves for an increase
in European competition in the context of economic
and monetary union. ABN Amro, BSCH and BBVA are
large banks in highly concentrated small or medium-
sized systems that are increasingly expanding their
operations to other geographical markets, since
domestic alternatives are limited. On the other hand,
HSBC, one of the largest banking and financial services
organizations in the world, has a more global
internationalization strategy.
Compared to the other big Latin American
countries, Brazil’s policy on foreign bank investment
has been successful in the sense that its selectiveness
prevented domestic private-sector banks from being
“swallowed up” by foreign ones. As a result, private-
sector domestic banks are still hegemonic in Brazil
compared to foreign ones. The events in Argentina in
2001 and 2002 demonstrate the problems that an
economy faces during an economic and financial crisis
when the financial system is dominated by foreign
banks. By contrast, domestic private-sector banks in
Brazil performed well during the turbulence of 2001-
2002, and this has helped the Brazilian economy to
mitigate the effects of the regional crisis. On the basis
of the Brazilian experience, therefore, one possible
policy recommendation for emerging countries is that
a strong private-sector domestic banking sector can be
an important factor in preventing a currency crisis from
turning into a financial crisis.
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